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LOGICAL THEORY AND HUMAN PRACTICES.  
SOME REMARKS ON THE METAPHYSICAL 
PRESUPPOSITIONS AND USE OF FORMAL LOGIC
Abstract: This paper’s aim is to help winnow out some ideas about the role of  
formal logic in human doings at large. I start by discussing some metaphysi-
cal presuppositions of  logical theory; specifically, I attempt to work towards 
a clearer understanding of  the role of  modalities, together with the notions 
of  meaning and truth, in mainstream logical theory. I then appeal to a modal 
formal semantics (Brandom, 2007a) in order to outline the cognitive role of  
logical constants in general. From these discussions I conclude that any view 
of  formal logic, and its core concepts, which does not involve a grasp of  what 
we do with them will be found to be distorted.
Keywords: Inferentialism, Intensional Formal Semantics, Neo-pragmatism
TEORÍA LÓGICA Y PRÁCTICAS HUMANAS. ALGUNAS 
OBSERVACIONES SOBRE LAS PRESUPOSICIONES 
METAFÍSICAS Y LA FUNCIÓN DE LA LÓGICA FORMAL
Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es ayudar a discernir algunas ideas respec-
to del papel de la lógica formal en las prácticas humanas en general. Comienzo 
considerando algunas presuposiciones metafísicas de la teoría lógica; en par-
ticular, intento presentar una comprensión más clara del papel de las moda-
lidades, así como de las nociones de significado y verdad, en la teoría lógica 
moderna. Recurro entonces a una semántica formal de tipo modal (Brandom, 
2007a) para perfilar el papel cognoscitivo de las constantes lógicas en general. 
A partir de estas discusiones, concluyo que cualquier concepción de la teoría 
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lógica y sus conceptos fundamentales que no involucre lo que hacemos con 
ellos será en definitiva distorsionada. 
Palabras clave: inferencialismo, semántica formal intensional, neo-pragmatismo. 
I
Historically, views advocating a necessary relationship between 
logic and man’s cognitive endeavors have been the norm.1 Similarly, 
the leading figures of  modern logic have acknowledged, and cultiva-
ted, a close connection between logic and knowledge in general, and 
between logic and philosophy in particular; the work of  Frege, Russell, 
Wittgenstein and Quine,2 to name a few, witness to this. However, at 
times there appears to be an insurmountable crevasse between a tech-
nically complex formal science such as our contemporary logic and the 
rest of  the philosophical realm. My starting-point is that the centrality 
granted to the concept of  deductive consequence by the model-theo-
retic approach, to the detriment of  the epistemically robust concept of  
inference, has rendered the connection between logic and the rest of  
our intellectual concerns somewhat blurred.3 More accurately, howe-
1   Two illustrious examples, among many others, quickly come to mind. The stoics 
used to compare philosophy with an egg, so that ethics would be like the egg’s 
yolk, physics would be the white, and logic would be the shell, that is, the struc-
ture without which knowledge would be impossible. (See Diogenes Laertius, 
7.38-41). In a quite similar vein, Kant readily underscores from the start of  his 
Critique of  Pure Reason the role of  logic as the propaedeutic of  all knowledge. 
Kant, I., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Reclam Verlag, 1986, (1787), B, IX. Two equa-
lly valuable, and equally thorough, works dealing with this issue are the classical 
Kneale, W., & Kneale, M., The Development of  Logic, Oxford University Press, 
1971, and Deaño, A., Concepciones de la lógica, Madrid, Taurus, 1980.
2  See, for example, Macbeth, D., Frege’s Logic, Harvard University Press, 2005. Hyl-
ton, P., Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of  Analytic Philosophy, Oxford University 
Press, 1993, and Hylton, Quine, Routledge, 2007.
3  This point has been pressed e.g. by Sundhom. His contention is that at the basis 
of  the concept of  logical consequence lies a verification-transcendent concept 
of  truth, whereby the formula α could be claimed to be a logical consequence 
of  the set Гof  formulae regardless of  how one comes to know that every case 
in which the elements of  Г are true, α is true too. Such disdain of  epistemic 
issues would stand at odds with the eminently cognitive nature of  the concept, 
and the practice, of  inference. A consequence-based view of  logic, Sundolhm 
concludes, would obliterate its cognitive aim, namely to obtain new knowledge 
from knowledge one already has. Sundholm, G., «‘Inference versus consequen-
ce’ revisited: inference, consequence, conditional, implication», Synthese (2012), 
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ver, I see the partial estrangement between logic and philosophy as re-
sulting from the extensional formal semantics by means of  which the 
concept of  logical consequence is explicated since Tarski. Aiming at 
the highest exactness and univocality, extensional semantics may have 
obscured the picture in another way nonetheless. My hypothesis is that 
a reasoned readmission into mainstream formal semantics of  some 
intensional notions could help us to better appreciate the cognitive 
role of  logic. In order to argue for such readmission, I will raise some 
doubts about the actual success of  extensionally-minded logicians in 
explaining away intensional notions. 
Let us begin with modalities. In this connection, it is striking that 
a full-blooded champion of  extensional truth-conditional semantics 
such as the Tractarian Wittgenstein ends up acknowledging, unwit-
tingly but unmistakably, its inextricably modal presuppositions; an 
instance among others of  this admission is proposition 4.024: “To 
understand a proposition means to know what is the case if  it is 
true. (One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether 
it is true) (…)”4 The conditionals employed here by Wittgenstein 
are clearly counterfactual, and hence modal ones. To understand the 
significance of, say, p → q, this extensional approach tells us, consists 
in knowing its truth conditions. As simple and forceful as it is, a key 
feature involved in this semantic clause is sometimes subtly disregar-
ded. According to the truth-functional account, one grasps what p 
→ q signifies when one grasps not the actual truth values of  p and q, 
but rather insofar as one grasps the possible valuations of  p and q that 
would render the complex formula true, regardless of  their actual va-
luations. The point I want to raise here is, I think, just as simple and 
forceful as the truth-functional account itself: understanding what 
the truth table of  p → q tells us is no less than knowing that the 
combined eventual truth of  p and falsity of  q in a given valuation 
is incompatible with the complex formula p → q being true; in other 
words, what one is to grasp in order to count as having understood 
the truth table of  p → q is that it would be impossible for p → q to be 
true in an interpretation Ii if  p were true and q false in Ii. My point, 
No. 187, pp. 943-956.
4  Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus, London, Routdlegde, 2002, (1922).
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then, is that just as with ordinary language expressions,5 mastering 
the truth-functional semantic clause for a logical constant is maste-
ring a counterfactual conditional. It is not actually feasible for anybo-
dy to grasp –let alone apply– what an extensional truth-conditional 
account of  meaning consists in without their having an antecedent 
mastery –an implicit one, if  you will– of  intensional concepts such as 
possibility, or those definable from it (such as incompatibility). 
This suggestion is likely to be quickly dismissed by pointing to the 
ease with which possible worlds semantics can account for counter-
factuals and modalities in purely extensional terms. Indeed, nobody is 
to deny the smoothness, elegance, and efficacy to many purposes with 
which this technical apparatus runs. Our doubts here are prompted not 
by a technical insufficiency, but rather by a conceptual one. Borrowing 
Frank Ramsey’s wordsat the service of  a different, albeit not wholly 
unrelated, discussion,6 thinking that possible worlds semantics actually 
spares us from dealing at some point with irreducibly modal concepts 
appears to be like feigning anesthesia. The expectation of  explaining 
away modal concepts by means of  possible worlds semantics seems 
ultimately question-begging, for such an extensional account is in fact 
intelligible only on condition that one implicitly operates with the very 
explicandum.7
5  In Sellars the counterfactual component underlying meaning at large is presen-
ted in a most convincing, although at times also abstruse, manner. Sellars, W., 
«Inference and Meaning», Mind, New Series, Vol. LXII, (Jul., 1953) No. 247, pp. 
313-338.
6   It is the discussion on the physicalist reduction of  statements about personal 
experiences. See for instance Ayer, A.J., Logical Positivism, New York, The Free 
Press, 1959, p. 20.
7  In this connection, Brandom notes that “as Quine emphasized, the modal voca-
bulary whose use is essential to this semantic approach evidently falls within the 
circle of  terms and concepts to which empiricist suspicions and questions apply. 
Whether possible worlds are thought of  as abstract objects, as concrete parti-
culars spatio-temporally unconnected to our universe, or as sui generis possibilia, 
the epistemological question of  how we are to understand the possibility of  
our knowing anything about such items (and their accessibility relations), and the 
question how, if  the possibility of  such cognitive contact is mysterious, the idea of  
our having the semantic contact necessary so much as to talk or think about them 
can be made intelligible, are wholly untouched by this formal apparatus [possible 
worlds semantics], and remain every bit as pressing as before”. Brandom, R., 
«Modality and Normativity: From Hume and Quine to Kant and Sellars», 2007, 
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In the eyes of  some, extensional truth-conditional semantics ad-
mittedly has killed two birds with one stone, for ridding us of  moda-
lities is only part of  an enterprise that rids us of  the equally awkward 
concept of  meaning. To assess its efficacy in achieving this latter aim, 
let us add to the previous observation a parallel one, resulting this time 
from consideration of  atomic formulae, that is, formulae of  the form 
Pa. To grasp the meaning of  the atomic formula Pa is to grasp its truth 
conditions, the account goes. The latter, in turn, are customarily taken 
to be captured by the following clause: Pa is true if, and only if, the 
object named a is part of  the extension of  the predicate P. Although 
for many purposes this schematic grasp of  truth is quite thorough, the 
philosophically minded are liable to query how one actually comes to 
know that the object named a is part of  the extension of  P. The stan-
dard answer, i.e., “I know that a is part of  the extension of  P because 
a is an element of  the set P” is unlikely to satisfy them. For, granted 
that this answer is both efficacious and efficient in dealing with formal 
structures, the point remains that knowing whether an individual has a 
given property is, above all, a cognitive activity, and as such is in effect far 
more complex than what the extensionally-minded theoretician deems 
appropriate to assume. In order to know if  it is the case that the object 
a has the property P I must, to begin with, know what P means. One 
cannot expect the meaning of  P to be ultimately settled by the exten-
sion of  the set P, but rather the other way about: first one knows (to 
a greater or lesser degree) what P means, and only then is one able to 
give the extensional definition of  the set P.8 If  there is substance in 
this, we might have grounds for questioning the view that takes truth 
as an ultimately extensional concept (or as successfully reducible to an 
Available at http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/locke/locke-w5.html [retrieved 
on Oct. 10, 2013] 
8   As Hylton shows, this thought, or something quite akin to it, is advocated by 
Russell in Principia Mathematica: “It is an old dispute whether formal logic should 
concern itself  mainly with intensions or with extensions (…) The facts seem to 
be that, while mathematical logic requires extensions, philosophical logic refuses 
to supply anything except intensions. Our theory of  classes reconciles these two 
apparently opposite facts, by showing that an extension (…) is an incomplete 
symbol, whose use always requires its meaning through a reference to intension” 
Whitehead, A.N. and Russell, B., Principia Mathematica, Cambridge University 
Press, 1910.Cited by Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and…, cit., p. 290.
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extensional concept).  Meaning, and not reference alone, is inextricably 
bound up with truth, and thus with any theoretical enterprise resting 
on the latter concept.9 This in turn would beg the question as to the 
actual extensional purity of  extensional semantics at large.
An objection to these suggestions is readily available. Admitte-
dly, predicates can be thought of  as sets. Consistent adversaries of  
concepts and other abstract entities, such as Quine, have no reserva-
tions in admitting sets as entities, inasmuch as they can be accounted 
for in fully extensional terms. The objector, then, finds our position 
incomprehensible, since an utterly reference-based explanation is avai-
lable; one that successfully explicates what a predicate is with all the 
exactness that could be desired. Nevertheless, I think this is just an 
instance of  the subtle, although persuasive, distortions an insufficiently 
qualified empiricism is liable to. One can certainly construct as many 
sets as one pleases by, as it were, merely haphazardly adding elements 
to their extensions, and hence without appealing to an independently 
settled admission criterion for such elements. However, this is not the 
way we actually construct sets for most cognitively or communicatively 
significant purposes. At any rate, this is clearly not the manner in which 
we fix the extension of  most of  the predicates we use in theoretical 
and ordinary activities. Normally, what we do first is to identify the 
criterion by means of  which we are to pick out its elements. When 
dealing with formal structures one may have plenty of  occasions to 
usefully create sets randomly, i.e., without appealing to their intensions 
in order to fix their extensions. But we are to admit that, as legitimate 
as it is, this use of  sets and predicates is eccentric as compared to our 
mainstream cognitive and communicative practice in theoretical and 
ordinary realms. 
We have claimed that to assess the truth of  the atomic formula 
Pa involves at bottom more than knowing whether a is part of  the 
extension of  the set P; it is essentially an activity in which one inqui-
res into whether a falls under the intension of  P. And arguably one 
cannot know the latter unless one can also recognize possibilities and 
conditional necessities. For instance, in order to determine the truth 
9   I take Carnap to have tried to develop this thought. Carnap, R., Meaning and 
Necessity, Chicago, The University of  Chicago Press, 1948. 
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value of  the sentence “the geometric figure ABC is a triangle”, I may 
doubtlessly rely on an inspection of  the extension of  the predicate “x 
is a triangle”, so that if  ABC is actually an element of  the set dubbed 
“triangles”, I can conclude confidently that the sentence “ABC is a 
triangle” is true. However, if  this were the only feature on the grounds 
of  which I could tell whether or not ABC is a triangle, I could not se-
riously count as actually grasping the significance of  the predicate “x is 
a triangle”. At minimum, I should also know things such as “a triangle 
is necessarily a three-sided closed polygon” or “it is impossible for 
the sum of  a triangle’s internal angles to be greater than 180 degrees”. 
Meaning and modalities are ultimately interconnected; vindicating one 
is also vindicating the other.10 
Before moving on, I would like to point to one more modal pre-
supposition underlying standard logical theory. Specifically, it concerns 
the inference rules associated with a logical calculus. Let us think quic-
kly of  the inference figure associated with any inference rule, say mo-
dus ponens:
A → B 
A
---------
B
Although an inference rule can be shown to be semantically equivalent 
to a corresponding statement expressing a logical law, and viceversa,11 
an inference rule has a pragmatic force of  which the law lacks: the for-
mer is a prescription; it has normative force.12 Now, what would be the 
most accurate wording to capture both the semantic content and the 
10   This point is made from several different, although ultimately concurring, 
perspectives, in Brandom, «Pragmatism, Inferentialism, and Modality in 
Sellars’s Arguments against Empiricism», 2006, available at http://www.pitt.
edu/~brandom/currentwork.html [retrieved on Oct. 10, 2013]. Grice, H.P. and 
Strawson, P.F., «In Defense of  a Dogma», Philosophical Review, Vol. LXV (Apr., 
1956), No. 2, pp. 141-158. Strawson, “Causation and Explanation” in Vermazen 
B. and Hintikka J. (ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
11  An inference rule can be recast as a logical law by means of  the deduction 
theorem. A logical law can be shown to be equivalent to an inference rule by 
means of  the completeness theorem. 
12  See Lukasiewcz, “Outlines of  the History of  Propositional Logic”, 1934, cited 
by Deaño, Concepciones de la…, cit.
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pragmatic force of  the above inference schema? It should be something 
like “if  you asserted A → B and A, then of  necessity you would have 
to assert B.”13 Again, we come across a counterfactual conditional lying 
at the foundation of  formal logical theory. Granted that an extensional 
account of  counterfactuals is available via possible worlds semantics, 
there is hardly any Elementary Symbolic Logic instructor who would 
rely on the antecedent mastery of  this technical apparatus on the part 
of  her average student. When it comes to the way theoreticians and 
students actually study and apply formal logic’s inference rules, it is a 
strong command of  modal notions what is indispensable. Later on I 
will say something else in connection with this. 
II
If  the previous suggestion about the inextricably modal nature 
of  logical vocabulary is not fatally flawed, one could expect an overtly 
modal formal semantics to be more valuable than its non-modal ex-
tensional counterparts for certain specifically philosophical concerns, 
namely, for capturing the actual cognitive significance of  logical vo-
cabulary.14 In order to explore this thought, I would like to discuss 
some features of  a recent proposal along these lines, namely Robert 
Brandom’s incompatibility formal semantics.15 
13   More accurately, the formulation should be “if  you asserted A → B and A, of  
necessity either you would have to assert B, or admit the falsity of  one of  the 
premises”. 
14   I take the semantic primitiveness of  logical incompatibility relations to have 
been unwittingly observed by the Tractarian Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein, Trac-
tatus Logic-Philosophicus…, cit., prop. 6.3751. And explicitly acknowledged by the 
post-Tractarian Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein, «Some Remarks on Logical Form» 
in Copi, I. y Beard, R. (eds.), Essays on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, New York, Macmi-
llan, 1966, (1929), pp. 31-37. I develop these thoughts at large in Moscaritolo, 
A., «Significado y razones. Posibilidades y desafíos para la semántica inferencia-
lista de R. Brandom», Chapter I «Del atomismo al holismo semántico», Trabajo 
especial de grado para el título de Magister Scientiarum en Filosofía, Mención 
Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia. Comisión de Estudios de Postgrado, Facultad 
de Humanidades y Educación, UCV, 2011, pp. 10-31.
15   Brandom, Between Saying and Doing. Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008. However, we shall work here with Brandom, «Incompatibi-
lity, Modal Semantics and Intrinsic Logic», 2007, Available at http://www.pitt.
edu/~brandom/locke/locke-w5.html [retrieved on Oct. 10, 2013]
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Brandom’s starting-point is to take the modal concept of  incom-
patibility, construed as ‘non-compossibility’, i.e., as the negation of  
conjunct possibility, rather than truth as the cornerstone of  formal 
semantics. The traditional truth-based concept of  logical consequen-
ce is replaced by the incompatibility-based concept of  incompatibility 
consequence,16 which yields the exact same results as the former, i.e. 
whenever α is a logical consequence (in the traditional sense) of  the 
set Г, α is an incompatibility consequence of   Г, and vice versa. By 
means of  the core notion of  incompatibility, Brandom purports to 
explain the significance of  a logical operator by determining all the 
formulae incompatible with a formula whose main operator is the ope-
rator being defined. The basic motivation is straightforward: the signi-
ficance of  a linguistic expression in general consists, above all, in the 
differences it makes in the logical space, in the space of  reasons.17 To 
illustrate the general idea, let us glance at the incompatibility definition 
of  logical negation. The critical insight here is that p is entailed by all 
the formulae incompatible with p. Thus, instead of  the usual semantic 
clause for the logical negator, i.e. p is true if  and only if  p is false, one 
would say, to begin with, that p is incompatible with any formula r that is 
incompatible with any formula q incompatible with p.18 Let p be ‘Fido is a dog’, 
let p be ‘Fido is not a dog’, let r be ‘Fido is a Golden Retriever’, and 
let q be ‘Fido is a cat’. ‘Fido is not a dog’ is incompatible with ‘Fido is 
a Golden Retriever’, which in turn is incompatible with ‘Fido is a cat’, 
which in turn is incompatible with ‘Fido is a dog.’19
16  Using ╞I  to indicate incompatibility consequence, Г╞I α if, and only if, every set 
X of  formulae incompatible with α is also incompatible with Г. See Brandom, 
Incompatibility, Modal Semantics…, cit., pp. 11 and ss. 
17  As Brandom himself  is always quick to acknowledge, one important distal sou-
rce of  both the term “space of  reasons” and this semantic insight is W. Sellars. 
18  Brandom, Incompatibility, Modal Semantics…, cit., p.12.Two warnings are in order. 
First, it is worth noticing that the cumbersome wording in giving the incompati-
bility semantic clause for p cannot be averted by using the easier, but only see-
mingly equivalent, clause “p is incompatible with any formula q incompatible 
with p”. Indeed, p is entailed by any formula q incompatible with p: “Fido is not 
a dog” is entailed by ‘Fido is a cat’, which is incompatible with ‘Fido is a dog”. 
Secondly, the incompatibility semantic clause for p just given is not completely 
accurate, for incompatibility is in effect a relation among sets of  sentences rather 
than among single sentences. 
19  Ibid., p. 19. 
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Of  course, if  this semantics is to be taken seriously as an alternati-
ve to possible worlds semantics, it is to account for all the logical locu-
tions, including alethic modalities. Not only does it do this, but, inter-
estingly enough, it shows all the non-modal operators thereby defined 
to behave classically; also, the operators of  necessity and possibility can 
be shown to yield all the theorems of  S5.20 Moreover, incompatibility 
semantics can be developed extensionally, despite the intensional natu-
re of  its founding concept.21
The problem, however, is that the resulting explications depend 
on a locution belonging to the very same set that constitutes the ex-
plicandum, namely the modal concept of  possibility (for, again, in-
compatibility amounts to non-compossibility). Brandom claims to 
have avoided this circularity by defining the modal alethic operators in 
terms of  the normative pragmatic concepts which, he argues, underlie 
language use in general, namely those of  assertional commitment and 
entitlement.22 The general claim is that a speaker who is assertionally 
commitment with, say, ‘necessarily p’, is also to count as assertionally 
committed with p and precluded from entitlement to assert p. In-
deed, a basic tenet of  Brandom’s neo-pragmatism is that semantics is 
ultimately reducible to pragmatics.23 I have argued elsewhere that this 
subordination is untenable.24 Nonetheless, the merits of  Brandom’s 
20   All the theorems of  classical logic are provable on the basis of  incompatibility 
readings of  the standard operators. Ibid., p. 22, and pp.46 and ss. 
21   Indeed, Brandom provides the semantic clauses for all the operators in set-theo-
retic terms. 
22  Brandom, Making It Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, 
chapter 3 “Linguistic Practice and Discursive Commitment”, Harvard Universi-
ty Press, 1998, pp. 141 and ss.
23   Brandom, Articulating Reasons, Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 186 and ss.
24   Moscaritolo, Significado y razones. Posibilidades…, cit., especially chapter IV, «Lími-
tes de la pragmática social en la explicación del contenido conceptual». Confes-
sedly, Brandom’s aim is to “(…) explain what is asserted by appeal to features 
of  assertings, what is claimed in terms of  claimings (…)”. Brandom, Articulating 
Reasons…, cit., p. 4. In turn, he expects to explain the force of  those speech acts 
by means of  his normative pragmatics, whose key concepts are those of  assser-
tional commitment and entitlement. However, I argue that one cannot account 
for the ability of  linguistic practitioners to distinguish these normative statuses 
unless their discernment is steered by an antecedent knowledge of  semantic ru-
les: it is because I have some knowledge of  the meaning of  the predicates invol-
ved in a claim that I can pick out the additional commitments and entitlements 
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intensional formal semantics are independent of  this last step. To tac-
kle semantic concerns with the help of  the concept of  incompatibi-
lity gives us a uniquely insightful picture into the actual cognitive and 
communicative significance of  the corresponding language. Success in 
understanding what meaning is, and in applying this idea to particular 
languages, both natural and formal, requires holding on to a founding 
semantic idea, one that either presides over, or incessantly hovers on, 
the thought of  virtually all those who have taken an interest in these 
matters. The point is pressed eloquently by the Tractarian Wittgens-
tein: “ (…) A proposition, a picture, or a model is, in the negative sen-
se, like a solid body that restricts the freedom of  movement of  others, 
and, in the positive sense, like a space bounded by solid substance in 
which there is room for a body.”25 A formula has actual semantic signi-
ficance inasmuch as it makes some difference in the ‘logical space’, that 
is, inasmuch as its assertion both expands and restricts the possibilities 
of  making other assertions about the same subject-matter. This is the 
key virtue of  incompatibility semantics: while truth and assertibility 
are certainly important features of  meaning, incompatibility is not only 
just as important, but also the distinctive feature of  semantic content; it 
is the one feature that succeeds in giving a comprehensive account of  
the cognitive and communicative role of  linguistic expressions, both 
formal and ordinary. Incompatibility semantics would prove most use-
ful even if  it were not found to be fully self-sufficient, for, borrowing 
Sellars’s words, it does succeed in providing us with a functional account 
of  logical terms. It tells us what a logical term is, or more accurately, 
what it does. 
Proverbially metaphoric G. Ryle instructs us in these matters by 
comparing formal logical locutions with coins: just as the invention of  
coins greatly facilitated trade in virtue of  their having explicitly defined 
exchange-values, thus allowing for an accurate standard with which to 
conduct and assess commercial transactions regardless of  the goods 
being traded, the coining of  logical constants, Ryle suggested, aims to 
facilitate the appraisal of  inferential transactions. For just like coins, 
they are explicitly introduced with clear-cut meanings; and, just like 
anybody undertakes by asserting it. 
25  Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus…, cit., prop.4.463
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coins, their presence allows us to appraise inferential transactions re-
gardless of  the subject-matter of  those transactions.26  This thought, 
together with the general spirit of  Brandom’s incompatibility seman-
tics, give us the opening to put together some ideas about the role of  
logical constants. At the highest level of  generality, logical constants 
–both ordinary and formal– are conceptual tools whose function is to 
bring out the roles that each formula, or propositional content, has in 
an inference.27 Logical constants tell us what a formula is worth in in-
ferential dealings, that is, what one can and hence cannot do with it for 
inferential purposes. For example, following the also Rylean thought 
that conditional statements are inference tickets,28 discursively ‘owning’ 
a conditional such as “If  it rains, then the streets will get wet” gives 
us enough purchase power to ‘own’ also the assertion that the streets 
will get wet insofar as the former is complemented in its purchase 
power with the assertion that it rains. While discursively owning the 
disjunction that either Hillary Clinton or Joe Biden will run for pre-
sident in 2016 falls short of  having enough purchase power to let us 
own any of  the separate claims ‘Hillary Clinton will run for president 
in 2016’, ‘Joe Biden will run for president in 2016’, it does nonetheless 
have enough purchase power to let us own the claim that a former 
Obama administration official will run for president in 2016. 
As to formal logical constants, they have been deliberately desig-
ned to bear their value on their face. But just like a five-euro bill, as 
unambiguous about its exchange-value as it is, can be used to buy 
certain things only within a limited geographical realm, we may find 
it natural to inquire about the cognitive and communicative realm 
within which the vocabularies of  the diverse logical systems lend 
themselves to be used. While a thorough answer is beyond our ambi-
tions here, we might make a start by appreciating how classical logic’s 
26   See Ryle, G., Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, 1964, pp. 119-121.
27  A similiar point is made by Frapolli: “Logical constants are higher-order predi-
cables that have 0-adic predicables as arguments. They don’t name any kind of  
entity but rather are natural language devices for making inferential relations 
among concepts and propositional contents explicit”. Frapolli, M. J., «Redefining 
Logical Constants as Inference Markers», The Linguistic Review, Vol. XIX (2012), 
No. 4, p.7
28  See Ryle, The Concept of  Mind, London, Hutchinson’s University Library, 1954, 
pp. 121 and ss.
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vocabulary is suitable to express inferences from theories whose va-
luations are complete and consistent (i.e., in which both the law of  
excluded middle and the law of  non-contradiction hold.)29 Indeed, 
and in contrast to a common view, the material conditional does in-
dicate inferential proprieties. It is worth stopping to see why.
Medieval logicians thought of  our modern concepts of  inference, 
logical consequence, and conditional statement as mere variants of  a 
single concept: their term “consequence” denoted a hypothetical pro-
position which could be expressed equivalently by the words ‘si’ (if), 
‘sequitur’ (follows), and ‘igitur’ (therefore).30 However, in the eyes of  
some modern logicians, whoever expects a formal language operator 
to express a metalinguistic relation such as entailment is committing 
the most elementary of  mistakes.31 Be that as it may, there’s an evident 
resemblance between p → q and p╞ q, which indeed suggests that the 
former is an object-language simulator of  the latter.32 It is in fact an 
easy point to make. On the one hand, the metalinguistic statement ‘p 
entails q’ is true if  and only if  there is no interpretation in which p is 
true and q false. On the other hand, the object-language statement p 
→ q is true in an interpretation Ii if  and only if  it is not the case that 
p is true and q false in Ii; that is, the truth of  p → q in a given inter-
pretation tells us that there is at least one interpretation in which it is 
not the case that p is true and q false. What is required for p to entail 
q is for the truth values of  p and q to behave in all interpretations just 
as in Ii. Put differently, the truth in a given interpretation of  p → q 
constitutes a necessary condition for the truth of  the statement p ╞ q. 
Via the soundness result, the truth of  p → q becomes also a necessary 
condition for the truth of  the statement p ├ q, i.e., for the inference 
from p to q to be sound.  The material implication is, then, inferentially 
significant. 
29 Both the point and the terminology are put forth by Beall, J.C., and Rest all, 
G., Logical Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2006, and Beall, Logic. The Basics, 
Routledge, 2010.
30  See Sundholm, Inference versus consequence…, cit., pp. 946-947.
31 The mistake conspicuously pointed out by Quine, namely, to conflate use and 
mention. See Quine, W.V., Word and Object, The MIT Press, 1960. 
32   This point has been raised by e.g. Palau, G., Introducción filosófica a las lógicas no 
clásicas, Barcelona, Gedisa, 2002, p. 35.
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Evidently, the inferential significance of  the material implication 
by far fails to capture all the inferentially relevant shades of  meaning 
of  its rich ordinary analogue. But another metaphor of  Ryle’s may be 
the beginning of  wisdom here:
The logician’s ‘and’, ‘not’, ‘all’, ‘some’, and the rest are not our 
familiar civilian terms; they are conscript terms, in uniform and 
under military discipline, with memories, indeed, of  their previous 
more free and easy civilian life, though they are not living those 
lives now.33
Frege opened the very first systematic account of  what came to 
be classical logic with this warning: “this ideography (…) is a device 
intended for certain scientific purposes, and one must not condemn it 
because it is not suited to others.”34 The moral to be drawn from these 
observations is that one cannot impugn the significance accorded to 
the vocabulary of  a logical system merely because it doesn’t suit all 
of  our inferential dealings. This is in fact a variation of  a more ge-
neral theme, namely, the issue of  the rivalry that might exist between 
different logical systems. Here we embrace the thought that seeking 
to determine what logic is “the right logic” is as doomed to failure as 
are most, if  not all, absolutistic pretensions in philosophy.35 There is 
room for logical pluralism on the grounds of  the different applications 
to which each system, and specifically the vocabulary of  each system, 
lend themselves.36 
III
While Brandom’s detour into pragmatics may not yield the foun-
dation for semantics he seeks, it nevertheless may be used to illuminate 
33  Ryle, Dilemmas…, cit., pp. 167-168. 
34  Frege, G., «Begriffsschrift, A Formula Language Modeled upon that of  Arith-
metic, for Pure Thought » in Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1972, (1879), p. 4. 
35  In contrast with views such as J. Peregrin’s, who argues for the priority of  intui-
tionist logic from an inferentialist perspective, my position is akin to Brandom’s. 
Peregrin, J., “Brandom’s Incompatibility Semantics”, in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 
XXXVI (2008), No. 2, pp. 99-121. (read my review for ideas about the depen-
dence of  PWS on an intensional semantics). Brandom, «Reply to J. Peregrin», 
Philosophical Topics, Vol. XXXVI (2008), No. 2, pp. 148-152. 
36  This thesis is developed at length by Beall and Restall, Logical Pluralism…, cit.
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certain additional metaphysical presuppositions of  logical theory that 
usually receive scant attention. 
Arguably, a broadly pragmatist, i.e. epistemically involved, concep-
tion of  logic is to be grounded not in the concept of  deductive conse-
quence, but rather in the concept of  inference.37 Regardless of  whether 
or not one takes meaning-based inferences as more fundamental,38 a 
notion integral to the idea of  inference is that of  a rule. Inferential 
rules, both formal and meaning-based ones, are an instance of  con-
ceptual normativity, a phenomenon with which Brandom’s normative 
pragmatics deals in some detail. 
His basic insight is that concept-deploying creatures exhibit by 
principle the following features: 1. They are held accountable for (at 
least some of) their expressive concept-involving activities; 2. They 
can meet (at least some of) those justificatory demands; 3. They ack-
nowledge (at least some of) the consequences of  their expressive con-
cept-involving activities. In a nutshell, expressive conceptual practice 
requires its practitioners to be able to acknowledge two types of  nor-
mative status: commitments and entitlements. For example, to count 
as understanding the meaning rule of  the predicate “x is a square”, you 
are to know, at the very least, that attributing it to a given particular 
commits you willy-nilly to attribute it also the predicate “x has four 
equal sides”. To count as understanding the meaning rule of  the pre-
dicate “x is a bird”, you are to know, at the very least, that attributing it 
to a given particular prima facie entitles (but does not commit) you to 
attribute it also the predicate “x can fly”.
As the previous examples hint, the very talk of  rules of  any kind 
presupposes the idea of  agents whose actions are to be constrained by 
such rules. To say that modus ponens is a formal inference rule is to say, 
essentially and not just incidentally, that it governs the actions of  in-
ferential agents. Because of  its own nature, normative pragmatics lends 
itself  to illuminate the role formal logical rules play in actual human 
inferential activities, that is, the ways in which they guide what inferen-
37  See Sundholm, Inference versus consequence…, cit.
38    The priority of  meaning-based inferences is advocated e.g. by Brandom, Making 
It Explicit. Reasoning…, cit. Brandom, Articulating Reasons…, cit. and Sundholm, 
Inference versus consequence…, cit.
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tial agents do. Formal inferential rules can thus be found to set either 
the consequential obligations that an agent undertakes in accepting the 
truth of  certain propositions, or the prima facie inferential rights he 
thereby acquires.
The above remarks are indeed there formulation of  an old and 
quite familiar difference between two types of  inference rules, i.e. bet-
ween deductive inferential rules on the one hand, and inductive ones, 
on the other. Despite this parallelism, the pragmatic construal remains 
interesting, for it is the one perspective that brings out what we do with 
them, or rather what they do to us as regulators of  our inferential ac-
tivities. 
IV
One last Rylean metaphor might prove useful. Logic is to philo-
sophy, Ryle claimed, what parade ground military drills are to actual 
battle: while the artificiality of  the former is at odds with actual battle 
conditions, the good soldier nevertheless is she who, having mastered 
those stereotyped, controlled drills, makes sensible use of  the skills 
thereby learned to succeed in the haphazard battle ground.39 Thinking 
of  logical theory as, at least in part, a regulatory ideal steering our infe-
rential practices might help bring out one of  logic’s specific roles in our 
lives, both as theoreticians and laymen: logic could be seen as modeling 
form all your multifarious inferential activities so as to produce ideal 
standards by which the correctness of  those practices can be assessed. 
Precisely because of  the complexity of  those activities and the variety 
of  contexts in which they are performed, a single model reasonably 
could not be expected to do the entire job. The coexistence of  diverse 
logical systems would then appear quite natural to us.40
Thinking of  logic as a formal science not only operationally but 
also as regards its ultimate object of  inquiry can doubtlessly bear fruit 
in some areas. But this cannot be the end of  the story. I have tried to 
argue that even those contented with a scrupulously formalistic view 
of  logic undertake metaphysical commitments of  which one cannot 
make sense except against an epistemically charged background. I will 
39  See Ryle, Dilemmas…, cit., p. 112. 
40  This form of  pluralism is advocated by Beall and Restall, Logical Pluralism…, cit.
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put forward one more observation in favor of  this general claim, one 
which I take to be just as self-evident as it is forgotten. The alliance 
between philosophy and logic, renewed to this day by almost every 
philosopher since it was first subscribed by Aristotle, makes sense only 
insofar as logic constitutes a tool propitious to secure the philosopher’s 
main aim, namely to disentangle substantial relations of  entailment and 
incompatibility, i.e., relations between concepts that are anything but 
‘formal’. Formal logic, the philosopher trusts, aims to cast light on the 
inferential relations underlying our varied conceptual activities from 
the vantage-point accorded to it by its formality. Were logic found not 
to be in this business anymore, we would be well advised to find quic-
kly a replacement for it. 
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